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Justice Wilson’s Administrative
Law Legacy:
The National Corn Growers Decision
and Judicial Review of
Administrative Decision-Making
Philip Bryden∗

I. INTRODUCTION
On November 8, 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada released its
decision in National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal).1
Justice Wilson’s concurring judgment in the National Corn Growers
case was among the last of her contributions to the Supreme Court of
Canada’s jurisprudence prior to her retirement on January 4, 1991. This
decision was not, perhaps, among the highlights of an extraordinarily
distinguished judicial career,2 but for a variety of reasons it seems to me
that the National Corn Growers case is a particularly appropriate focal
point for consideration of Justice Wilson’s contribution to Canadian
administrative law jurisprudence.
During Justice Wilson’s tenure on the Supreme Court of Canada, the
Court released 80 decisions that held sufficient significance for persons
interested in Canadian administrative law to be reported in the

∗

Dean of Law, University of New Brunswick.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 110, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “National Corn
Growers”].
2
In his keynote address to the symposium held in Justice Wilson’s honour at Dalhousie
Law School on October 5, 1991, Chief Justice Brian Dickson paid particular attention to her
contributions to the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11, as well as criminal law, Aboriginal law and family law. See B. Dickson, “Madame
Justice Wilson: Trailblazer for Justice” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 1, at 6. Justice Wilson’s decision in
National Corn Growers was referenced by Chief Justice Dickson (at 13, note 29) but it occupies a
minor place in his discussion of her judicial legacy.
1
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Administrative Law Reports.3 Justice Wilson wrote reasons for judgment
in 19 of these cases. Ten of them were constitutional decisions that had
significant implications for administrative law.4 Five of the cases dealt
with areas of substantive law that were of importance for particular
administrative bodies but in which the reasons did not comment
extensively on the general principles governing judicial review of
administrative action.5 Only in the four remaining cases did Justice
Wilson comment at length on the principles governing common law
judicial review of the decisions of administrative tribunals that are the
focus of my observations in this article.6
3
A Westlaw e-Carswell search of Supreme Court of Canada decisions reported in the
Administrative Law Reports in which Justice Wilson participated in the decision produced 155 hits.
Since English- and French-language versions of the same case were recorded separately, the
elimination of duplicate cases produced the result of 80 relevant decisions.
4
These cases were: (1) Cuddy Chicks v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] S.C.J.
No. 42, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5 (S.C.C.) (dealing with the availability of remedies for Charter violations
from administrative tribunals under s. 24 of the Charter and s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982); (2)
Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] S.C.J. No. 124, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570
(S.C.C.) (concerning the scope of applicability of the Charter and the availability of remedies from
labour arbitrators for Charter violations); (3) MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] S.C.J. No. 99, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 796 (S.C.C.) (dealing with the scope of judicial immunity from public inquiries); a series of
cases concerning the applicability of s. 11(d) of the Charter in administrative proceedings: ((4) R. v.
Wigglesworth, [1987] S.C.J. No. 71, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541 (S.C.C.); (5) Burnham v. Metropolitan
Toronto Police Assn., [1987] S.C.J. No. 70, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 572; (6) Trumbley v. Metropolitan
Toronto Police Force, [1987] S.C.J. No. 68, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.); and (7) Trimm v.
Durham Regional Police Force, [1987] S.C.J. No. 72, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 582 (S.C.C.)); (8) Société des
Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Assn. of Parents for Fairness in Education, Grand Falls
District 50 Branch, [1986] S.C.J. No. 26, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549 (S.C.C.) (concerning the language
rights guarantees of s. 19(2) of the Charter); (9) Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J.
No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.) (concerning the “political questions” doctrine and the extent of
rights guaranteed under s. 7 of the Charter); and (10) Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.) (dealing with s. 7’s guarantee of
fair hearing rights for refugee claimants).
5
They were: (1) Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] S.C.J. No. 75, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 561 (S.C.C.) (concerning the duty of reasonable accommodation under human rights law);
(2) Kamloops (City) v. Neilsen, [1984] S.C.J. No. 29, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) (addressing the
liability of public authorities for negligence); (3) James Richardson & Sons Ltd. v. Minister of
National Revenue, [1984] S.C.J. No. 28, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 614 (S.C.C.) (dealing with the
interpretation of investigative powers granted under the Income Tax Act); (4) Hartel Holdings Ltd.
v. Calgary (City), [1984] S.C.J. No. 17, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 337 (S.C.C.) (concerning the interpretation
of Alberta land use planning law); and (5) R. v. Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., [1983] S.C.J. No. 87, [1983]
2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.) (addressing the scope of Crown immunity for Crown corporations being
prosecuted under the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23).
6
In addition to National Corn Growers, supra, note 1 case, these decisions were: (1) W.W.
Lester (1978) Ltd. v. United Assn. of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting
Industry, Local 740, [1990] S.C.J. No. 127, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 644 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lester”]; (2)
Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical and Allied Workers, Local 14, v. Paccar of
Canada, Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 107, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Paccar”]; and (3)
Oakwood Development Ltd. v. St. François Xavier (Rural Municipality), [1985] S.C.J. No. 49,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 164 (S.C.C.).
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The National Corn Growers decision is the most interesting of these
four cases in terms of its contribution to Canadian thinking about judicial
review of administrative decision-making. First of all, it is concerned
with two central and abiding questions in administrative law, namely,
the rationales for judicial deference to the substantive decisions of
administrative tribunals and the methodology courts should employ in
reviewing those decisions. Second, Justice Wilson’s reasons in this case
are very satisfying to an administrative law purist since they focus
almost exclusively on the administrative law dimensions of the case and
have relatively little to say about the substantive law underlying the
tribunal’s decision being reviewed. In contrast, in the other significant
substantive review decisions Justice Wilson wrote during her time on the
Supreme Court, it is more difficult to tease out how much of her decision
was driven by her administrative law philosophy and how much by her
approach to the issues of labour law7 and land use planning law8 that
were being addressed by the bodies whose decisions were under review.
Finally, Justice Wilson’s reasons in the National Corn Growers case
continue to exercise an influence on contemporary Supreme Court of
Canada jurisprudence on substantive review of the decisions of
administrative tribunals,9 notwithstanding considerable critical commentary
on Justice Wilson’s reasoning10 and the twists and turns of that
jurisprudence itself.11
It is not my goal in the following article to argue that Justice
Wilson’s thinking about substantive judicial review as exemplified by
her reasons in the National Corn Growers case has played a dominant
role in Canada’s administrative law jurisprudence. Nor is it to attempt to
7

See Lester and Paccar, id.
See Oakwood, supra, note 6.
9
See, for example, the reasons of Bastarache J. writing for the majority of the Court in
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1
S.C.R. 982 (S.C.C.), at paras. 36 and 48 [hereinafter “Pushpanathan”] and Abella J. writing for the
majority of the Court in Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., [2007]
S.C.J. No. 15, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.), at para. 104 [hereinafter “Via Rail”].
10
See, for example, David Mullan, “Of Chaff Midst the Corn: American Farm Bureau
Federation v. Canada (Canadian Import Tribunal) and Patent Unreasonableness Review” (1991) 45
Admin. L.R. 264, at 270-71; David Jones & Anne De Villars, Principles of Administrative Law, 2d
ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Canada Ltd., 1994), at 419-22 and 436-37; David Jones & Anne
De Villars, Principles of Administrative Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Canada Ltd.,
2004), at 461.
11
See, most recently, Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
190 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunsmuir”] and Assoc. des courtiers et agents immobiliers du Québec v.
Proprio Direct Inc., [2008] S.C.J. No. 32, 2008 SCC 32 [hereinafter “Proprio Direct”].
8
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spark a revival of Justice Wilson’s thinking about administrative law in
order to remedy deficiencies in the more recent jurisprudence in the area
of substantive judicial review. Rather, my observations are designed to
evaluate Justice Wilson’s reasoning in the National Corn Growers case
in light of subsequent judicial attempts to develop a more comprehensive
approach to common law judicial review of substantive administrative
decision-making in Canada. I conclude that Justice Wilson’s approach to
judicial review managed to avoid certain pitfalls that were to plague later
attempts to develop a unified theory of substantive judicial review.
Nevertheless, in my view her reasons share with more recent
jurisprudence the weakness that insufficient attention is paid to the
considerations that justify judicial intervention notwithstanding a more
general posture of deference to tribunal decision-making.
I will conduct this analysis in three parts. In the first, I will describe
the nature of the dispute in the National Corn Growers case and the
contrasting reasons of Justice Gonthier for the majority and Justice
Wilson concurring in the result. Second, I will situate Justice Wilson’s
reasoning in the National Corn Growers case within the framework of
the evolution of contemporary judicial review doctrine. Finally, I will
explore some of the key areas of disagreement that have emerged during
the evolution of substantive judicial review doctrine over the past 20
years and consider in more detail the relationship between Justice
Wilson’s insights in National Corn Growers and the resolution of those
tensions.

II. THE NATIONAL CORN GROWERS DECISION
The National Corn Growers case came to the Supreme Court of
Canada as an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal12
dismissing an application for judicial review under section 28 of the
Federal Court Act13 of a decision of the Canadian Import Tribunal.14 I
will set out the decisions at each stage in some detail because the shifting
nature of the debates that took place as the case wound its way through
the legal system help to sharpen the focus of the disagreement between

12
[1988] F.C.J. No. 1154, [1989] 2 F.C. 517 (Fed. C.A.) [hereinafter “National Corn
Growers (Fed. C.A.)”].
13
R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd Supp.).
14
Grain Corn (1987), 14 C.E.R. 1 (Canadian Import Tribunal) [hereinafter “Grain Corn”].
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the reasons offered by Wilson and Gonthier JJ. for concluding that the
courts should not interfere with the Tribunal’s decision.
The Tribunal had concluded that subsidization of the production of
corn by the United States was causing a material injury to Canadian corn
producers within the meaning of section 42 of the Special Import
Measures Act,15 which rendered American corn vulnerable to the
imposition of a special import duty. This determination had been the
subject of controversy even within the Tribunal itself. The majority of
the panel (President Bertrand and Member Perrigo) concluded that it was
not necessary to demonstrate that subsidized corn was actually being
imported into Canada in order to reach a finding that the subsidies were
causing “material injury” to Canadian producers. It was sufficient if, as
in this case, the threat of importation of the subsidized product had the
effect of depressing the prices obtained by Canadian producers of
the product.16 Member Bissonette, who dissented, took the view that the
countervail remedy was not available unless it could be demonstrated
that the harm being suffered was the result of subsidized imports.17
Member Bissonette conceded that United States subsidies were a
contributing factor to a depressed world market price for corn,18 but that
was not a sufficient basis for a finding of material injury to Canadian
producers within the meaning of SIMA in the absence of evidence that
subsidized American corn was actually being imported into Canada.
The Federal Court of Appeal divided along lines similar to the
Tribunal, though the reasons for its conclusions were slightly different
than those of the Tribunal. Chief Justice Iacobucci, which whom
Mahoney J.A. concurred, concluded that the majority of the Tribunal did
not, in the language of section 28 of the Federal Court Act, “err in law or
in jurisdiction” in interpreting section 42 of SIMA in a manner that
15

R.S.C. 1985, c. S-15 [hereinafter “SIMA”]. Section 42 reads, in relevant part:
42.(1) The Tribunal, forthwith after receipt by the Secretary pursuant to subsection
38(2) of a notice of a preliminary determination of dumping or subsidizing in respect of
goods, shall make inquiry with respect to such of the following matters as is appropriate in
the circumstances, namely,
(a) in the case of any goods to which the preliminary determination applies, as to whether
the dumping or subsidizing of the goods
(i) has caused, is causing or is likely to cause material injury or has caused or is
causing retardation, or
(ii) would have caused material injury or retardation except for the fact that
provisional duty was imposed in respect of the goods; ...
16
See Grain Corn, supra, note 14, at 15 and 21-22.
17
Id., at 36-40, 43.
18
Id., at 32-36, 42-43.
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allowed material injury to be demonstrated by the effect of American
corn subsidies on Canadian corn producers even in the absence of the
importation of subsidized corn.19 Chief Justice Iacobucci made no
reference in his reasons to deference to the Tribunal’s interpretation of
its enabling legislation, and in fact his reasoning for reaching the
interpretive conclusion he did is quite different than the reasoning of the
majority of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal majority took the view that its interpretation of section
42 of SIMA was consistent with Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)20 whereas Member Bissonnette drew support
from the GATT Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code for his
interpretation that section 42 of SIMA only dealt with the effect of
subsidized imports as distinct from the effect that foreign subsidies have
on the domestic price of Canadian products in the absence of importation
of the subsidized product.21 While Iacobucci C.J. accepted the general
proposition that domestic legislation should be interpreted in a manner
that is consistent with Canada’s international obligations,22 in his view
the focus of the interpretive exercise was the wording of the legislation
implementing an international obligation rather than the treaty itself.23
Chief Justice Iacobucci’s conclusion on the interpretive issue before him
is expressed in the following passage:
In my view section 42 is clear and unambiguous: although other
sections of the Act refer to the GATT and Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties Agreement which in turn use the term subsidized imports,
section 42 refers only to subsidizing of goods or subsidizing and makes
no reference to subsidized imports as being the cause of material injury
to producers.24

It is worth noting that Iacobucci C.J. acknowledged that this
interpretation might be incompatible with Canada’s fulfilment of its
international obligations under the GATT, but in his opinion that was a
matter to be addressed by Parliament rather than by the courts.25 He
recognized that the Tribunal majority had taken the view that its
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

National Corn Growers (Fed. C.A.), supra, note 12, at 527, 536-37.
See Grain Corn, supra, note 14, at 21-22.
Id., at 37-40.
See National Corn Growers (Fed. C.A.), supra, note 12, at 528.
Id.
Id., at 530-31.
Id., at 532-33.
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interpretation was consistent with a liberal understanding of the GATT
but he concluded: “I need not make any comment on whether that
approach is appropriate or not in matters of this kind because the
language of section 42 has in my view been otherwise correctly
interpreted by the Tribunal majority.”26
Justice MacGuigan dissented. He accepted Mr. Bissonnette’s view
that if section 42 of SIMA were read in light of the GATT Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties Code, it would be necessary to demonstrate that
material injury was caused by the presence in Canada of subsidized
imports rather than by the mere fact of foreign subsidization of a
product. Indeed, he concluded that “[t]here was no serious dispute in
argument”27 that this was the case. Justice MacGuigan took a different
view than Iacobucci C.J. of the jurisprudence concerning the use of
international treaties as an aid to the interpretation of domestic
legislation, particularly in situations in which it was evident from both
external and internal evidence that the legislation was intended to
implement the international obligation.28 In MacGuigan J.A.’s view,
SIMA
is so enmeshed with the Code that it must be taken to be an
implementation and reflection of it. It must therefore be presumed that
Parliament intended that SIMA should be interpreted in accordance
with the Code. Consequently, to the extent that the majority decision of
[the Tribunal] depended upon an interpretation of SIMA contrary to the
Code it was vitiated by error of law.29

In MacGuigan J.A.’s opinion, material injury in the past or present
as a result of subsidized imports could only be demonstrated if there was
evidence of an increase in the importation of subsidized goods, which
was not present in this case.30 Justice MacGuigan recognized that SIMA
provided for relief not only where material injury had been caused but
where the foreign action “is likely to cause material injury”.31 In his
opinion, however, such a determination could only be supported if the
Tribunal was able to draw an inference from the evidence before it with
respect to the likelihood of subsidized imports entering into the country
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id., at 533.
Id., at 545.
Id., at 552-54.
Id., at 554.
Id., at 557.
Id., at 558, quoting s. 42(1)(a)(i) of SIMA.
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in future. In MacGuigan J.A.’s view the Tribunal majority’s findings on
this point were based on mere speculation rather than reasoned
inferences from the evidence, and he would have returned the matter to
the Tribunal for reconsideration on whether there was a likelihood of
future injury that could be causally linked to subsidized imports.32
Neither Court of Appeal judgment made reference to section 76(1)
of SIMA, which at the relevant time stated: “Subject to this section and
paragraph 91(1)(g), every order or finding of the Tribunal is final and
conclusive.” This section of the Act assumed greater significance in the
Supreme Court of Canada, since Gonthier J. (with whom La Forest,
L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ. concurred) treated it as a privative
clause that prevented judicial interference unless “the tribunal acted
outside the scope of its mandate by reason of its conclusions being
patently unreasonable”.33 Justice Wilson (with whom Dickson C.J.C. and
Lamer J. concurred) also applied the “patently unreasonable” standard of
review, but it is less obvious from her reasons how significant the
existence of the privative clause was to her choice of this standard of
review. On one hand, she does make reference to it in her recitation of
relevant statutory provisions34 and in her description of Gonthier J.’s
reasons for applying the “patently unreasonable” standard of review.35
On the other hand, at several points in her reasons she makes reference
to judicial deference to tribunals whose decisions are not protected by
privative clauses36 and the general tenor of her reasons speaks as much to
judicial deference to the specialized expertise of tribunals in interpreting
their enabling legislation as to other rationales for a restrictive approach
to judicial review.37 I will return to the question of the rationales for
judicial deference to tribunal decision-making later in this article, but for
now it is sufficient to observe that all members of the Supreme Court of
Canada were satisfied that a deferential standard of review ought to be
applied to the Tribunal’s decision.
32

Id., at 559-61.
National Corn Growers, [1990] S.C.J. No. 110, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, at 1370 (S.C.C.).
34
Id., at 1350-51.
35
Id., at 1347.
36
Id., at 1340-41, Wilson J. referred to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Volvo
Canada Ltd. v. U.A.W., Local 720, [1980] S.C.J. No. 104, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 178 (S.C.C.); Douglas
Aircraft Co. of Canada v. McConnell, [1980] S.C.J. No. 106, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 245 (S.C.C.) and
Alberta Union of Provincial Employees, Branch 63 v. Olds College, [1982] S.C.J. No. 46, [1982] 1
S.C.R. 923 (S.C.C.) advocating deference respectively to the decisions of consensual arbitrators,
statutory arbitrators and labour boards even in the absence of a privative clause.
37
See, in particular, National Corn Growers, supra, note 33, at 1335-37, 1343, 1346.
33
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Justice Gonthier proceeded to address three issues using the
“patently unreasonable” standard of review:
(1) whether it was patently unreasonable for the Tribunal to give
consideration to the terms of the GATT in interpreting s. 42 of the
SIMA;
(2) whether it was patently unreasonable for the Tribunal to conclude
that, in applying s. 42 to this case, reliance could be placed on
potential as well as actual imports; and
(3) whether the Tribunal’s conclusion, on the evidence, that American
subsidization of imports had caused, was causing and was likely to
cause material injury to Canadian producers was patently
unreasonable.38

With the greatest of respect, the framing of the first issue is
somewhat surprising. The appellant’s case did not depend on a finding
that the Tribunal erred in using the GATT to interpret section 42 of
SIMA; in fact, the appellant’s success depended on the use of the GATT
to colour the interpretation of statutory language that, in the view of the
majority of the Court of Appeal, clearly favoured the conclusion reached
by the majority of the Tribunal. The appellant’s position was that the
Tribunal majority fundamentally misunderstood the GATT Subsidies
and Countervailing Duties Code, and therefore erroneously concluded
that the interpretation they gave to section 42 did not create a conflict
between that provision and Canada’s international obligations under the
Code.39 Justice Gonthier noted that no party to the appeal had argued that
the Tribunal acted unreasonably in referring to the GATT in interpreting
section 42 of SIMA,40 and it is evident that this part of his reasons was
directed more toward Iacobucci C.J.’s comments on the use of
international agreements as an interpretive aid than toward the
Tribunal’s decision itself. Justice Gonthier rejected Iacobucci C.J.’s
suggestion that recourse to an international treaty is unavailable as an
interpretive aid where domestic legislation is unambiguous on its face,
and indicated that at least where the legislation was designed to
implement the treaty obligation, the treaty could be used not only to

38

Id., at 1367-68.
Justice Gonthier appeared to recognize this in his description of the appellant’s position,
id., at 1368.
40
Id., at 1371.
39
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resolve a patent ambiguity but also to determine whether or not a latent
ambiguity exists.41
Having concluded that it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal to
have recourse to the GATT in interpreting section 42 of SIMA, Gonthier
J. moved on to the centrepiece of his reasons, namely, whether or not the
Tribunal’s interpretation of section 42 was patently unreasonable. Justice
Gonthier began this discussion by concentrating on an important passage
from the Tribunal majority’s judgment in order to undercut the argument
that the Tribunal majority had misunderstood a key distinction between
subsidized goods and subsidized imports. In this passage, the Tribunal
majority appeared to agree with the position taken by the appellants that
section 42 was designed to address the problems created by subsidized
imports rather than by subsidization more generally.
On the other hand, the Tribunal majority took the view that
“imports” had to include not only goods that were actually imported into
Canada but “potential or likely imports”.42 In Gonthier J.’s view, the role
of the Court was to determine whether or not this was an interpretation
that was open to the Tribunal under SIMA and the GATT, and whether
the Tribunal had sufficient evidence before it to be able to reasonably
conclude that the potential import of subsidized corn gave rise to
material injury in this case.43
Justice Gonthier concluded that neither SIMA nor the GATT made it
unreasonable for the Tribunal to have reference to potential imports in
determining the existence of material injury.44 Justice Gonthier disagreed
with the view expressed by MacGuigan J.A. in dissent in the Federal
Court of Appeal that the GATT Code forbade a finding of material
injury in the absence of an increase in the importation of a subsidized
product. In Gonthier J.’s view, an increase in subsidized imports was
only one way in which material injury could be demonstrated.45 He then
reviewed the evidence before the Tribunal and concluded that it was
reasonably open to the Tribunal to find in this particular case that
potential imports of subsidized corn from the United States gave rise to
material injury to Canadian corn producers, even in the absence of
evidence of growth in the importation of subsidized corn from the
41
42
43
44
45

Id., at 1371-72.
Id., at 1373, quoting Grain Corn, supra, note 14, at 22.
Id., at 1374.
Id., at 1374-78.
Id., at 1378-79.
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United States. This was because there was evidence of a considerable
surplus of United States corn that could easily have been imported had
Canadian producers failed to reduce their own prices in order to fend off
competition from imported American corn.46
As noted above, Wilson J. agreed with Gonthier J.’s disposition of
the appeal but she disagreed with the reasoning he employed to come to
this conclusion. Justice Wilson’s own reasons can be broken down into
two parts. The first was an extended discussion of the general approach
courts ought to take to judicial review of administrative tribunals, the
cornerstone of which was her analysis of the implications of the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Canadian Union of Public
Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.47 The second was
a much briefer application of these general principles in order to address
the decision of the Canadian Import Tribunal that was under review.
Justice Wilson took the position that the C.U.P.E. decision was
designed to leave behind an approach to judicial review that was
premised on the assumption that courts played a dominant role in
ensuring that administrative bodies operated within the strict limits of
their statutory mandates. It was necessary, in her view, to overcome
judicial resistance to the proposition that tribunals should not be subject
to the same review standards as courts. In an important passage, she
observed that judicial decisions imposing an intrusive standard of
review:
. . . reflect a lack of sympathy for the proposition that if administrative
tribunals are to function effectively and efficiently, then we must
recognize: (1) that their decisions are crafted by those with specialized
knowledge of the subject matter before them; and (2) that there is value
in limiting the extent to which their decisions may be frustrated
through an expansive judicial review.48

Having identified the type of approach to judicial review that in her
view C.U.P.E. was designed to avoid, Wilson J. then sought to put
forward a positive vision of what the C.U.P.E. approach to judicial
review was designed to achieve. Justice Wilson initially sought to
enumerate the reasons for judicial deference to the interpretations
administrative tribunals gave to their enabling legislation. She identified,
in greater or lesser detail, four different rationales for judicial deference
46
47
48

Id., at 1379-83.
[1979] S.C.J. No. 45, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C.U.P.E.”].
National Corn Growers, supra, note 33, at 1335.
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to the decisions of tribunals, all of which were relevant to this particular
case. It is less clear whether or not Wilson J. recognized that these
rationales do not always reinforce each other, and that in some instances
they lead to quite different conclusions about when deference is and is
not appropriate, or when judicial interference is warranted notwithstanding a general posture of deference.
The first rationale for deference that Wilson J. identified is what
might be described as the “statutory indeterminacy” rationale. This
rationale draws on the observation of Dickson J. (as he then was) in
C.U.P.E. that statutes rarely have a uniquely “correct” meaning that
judges are specially qualified to ascertain.49 This rationale is not so much
a justification for judicial deference as a rebuttal of the traditional claim
that the role of judicial review is to ensure that administrative bodies
confine themselves to the mandate conferred on them by the legislature.
At a minimum the indeterminacy rationale suggests that judges should
not use the cloak of statutory interpretation to substitute their policy
preferences for those of the tribunal that is interpreting its mandate, but it
is less obvious what guidance it offers about the circumstances in which
judicial intervention is warranted.
The second rationale for deference pointed out by Wilson J. could be
described as the “presumed expertise” rationale. This rationale, which is
also present in the C.U.P.E. decision, rests on the suggestion that
specialized tribunals may actually be better placed than courts to make
assessments of the interpretation of the tribunal’s mandate that best
serves the statutory purposes for which the tribunal was established.50 I
call it the “presumed expertise” rationale because Wilson J. did not spell
out how one is to decide whether or not the presumption that a tribunal is
better placed than a court to make these types of assessments is justified.
It is worth noting that this rationale carries with it, at least obliquely, the
seeds for greater judicial intervention than the “statutory indeterminacy”
rationale. This is because the presumed expertise rationale suggests that
the object of the interpretive exercise is not merely to ensure that
decisions fall within a range of justifiable choices, but to select the
choice that best serves the tribunal’s statutory goals. In many instances
the tribunal is likely to make that choice more effectively than a
reviewing court, but it is not obvious that it will always do so.

49
50

Id., at 1337-38.
Id., at 1338-39 and 1341-43.
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Justice Wilson’s third rationale for deference overlaps with but is
slightly different than the second, and it can be described as the
“economic management” rationale. The idea here is that some agencies
are established in order to carry out economic regulatory or management
functions with which courts are particularly ill-equipped to interfere.
Even though these agencies often have to interpret their enabling
legislation in order to carry out their regulatory or managerial functions,
there may not be a sharp demarcation between statutory interpretation
and policy-making. Moreover, interpreting legislation in a manner that
reflects sound policy choices is likely to call upon technical skills or
specialized knowledge of an industry that are quite different than the
skills of textual analysis that judges typically rely upon in interpreting
legislation.51 Although Wilson J. does not spell this out, the implication
is that some types of tribunal activity are more appropriate for judicial
intervention than others, and this idea emerges explicitly in subsequent
jurisprudence.52 The distinction between the “presumed expertise”
rationale and the “economic management” rationale is that the subject
matter of the tribunal’s expertise makes a difference, with the decisions
of some expert tribunals (for instance, human rights tribunals) being
more vulnerable to judicial intervention than the decisions of other
tribunals (for example, securities commissions).
The fourth rationale for judicial deference Wilson J. identified can
be called the “legislative choice” rationale. This rationale rests on the
right of the legislature, within constitutional limits,53 to curtail statutorily
the scope of judicial review of administrative decision-making. The
strong form of such limitations consists of the privative clause, and
Wilson J. did discuss the significance of privative clauses as a rationale
for limiting the intensity of judicial review, as did Dickson J. (as he then
was) in the C.U.P.E. case.54 Justice Wilson did not confine this rationale
to situations in which the legislature had expressly chosen to restrict the
51

See id., at 1336-37.
See Pushpanathan, [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at paras. 36 and 48
(S.C.C.), where Bastarache J. referred to Wilson J.’s reasons in National Corn Growers, supra, note
33 in support of the idea that judges should exercise restraint in reviewing the decisions of tribunals
engaged in management or regulatory activities that involve polycentric interest balancing. These
types of regimes can be contrasted to regimes that engage in rights-based decision-making, where
this rationale would suggest that judicial intervention is more easily justified.
53
For a discussion of these limits, see Crevier v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1981] S.C.J.
No. 80, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.); MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] S.C.J. No. 101,
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.).
54
See National Corn Growers, supra, note 33, at 1339, 1341-42.
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scope of judicial review, however, and embraced the broader argument
that the legislative choice to confer adjudicative authority on a
specialized tribunal was itself a reason for presuming that the legislature
intended courts to play a limited role in supervising the tribunal’s
exercise of its statutory mandate.55 A variation on the “legislative
choice” rationale for deference, to which Wilson J. did not give as much
attention as she might have, is a legislative preference for decisionmaking arrangements that sacrifice some level of quality control in order
to promote goals such as speed, accessibility or affordability. This line of
argument appears most often in procedural review cases as a justification
for significant departures from procedures modelled on those used by
courts, but it is not entirely irrelevant as a justification for limits on
judicial review, since any gains in quality of outcomes that may be
produced by more expansive judicial review are inevitably purchased at
a cost in terms of lack of finality, delay and financial expense, both to
parties and to the justice system.
Justice Wilson did not go so far as to adopt Professor Brian
Langille’s thesis that the Supreme Court of Canada had deliberately
adopted through a series of decisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s a
“restrictive and unified” theory of judicial review.56 Nevertheless, the
overall tone of her remarks suggests considerable sympathy with this
approach. Moreover, she did explicitly take aim at the possibility that in
its more recent decisions the Court had “shown signs of hesitation about
its commitment to the position set out in C.U.P.E.”.57 In particular, she
emphasized that courts should be careful not to be excessively eager to
classify a statutory provision being interpreted by a tribunal as one that
conferred jurisdiction on the tribunal. According to the jurisprudence at
the time, tribunal interpretations of these types of statutory provisions
were to be reviewed by courts using the “correctness” standard, and
Wilson J. saw the possible expansion of this category of provisions as
having the potential to undermine the progress Canadian courts had
made toward adopting a deferential approach to tribunal decisionmaking.58 Having made that observation, Wilson J. refrained from a
more detailed discussion of the proper approach to identifying
55

Id., at 1340-42.
See id., at 1340-42, in which Wilson J. referred to two articles by Professor Langille:
“Developments in Labour Law: The 1981-82 Term” (1983) 5 S.C.L.R. 225 and “Judicial Review,
Judicial Revisionism and Judicial Responsibility” (1986) 17 R.G.D. 169.
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National Corn Growers, id., at 1343-44.
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Id., at 1345.
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jurisdiction-limiting statutory provisions since there was no dispute in
the present appeal that the interpretation of section 42 of SIMA fell
squarely within the Canadian Import Tribunal’s jurisdiction.59
Justice Wilson’s observations on the rationales for judicial deference
to the interpretations specialized tribunals give to their enabling
legislation formed the backdrop to her analysis of the National Corn
Growers case itself. This analysis was centrally concerned with the
methodology the Court should adopt in reviewing the Tribunal’s
decision. Her criticism of Gonthier J.’s reasons was that he did not
concern himself exclusively with the question of whether the Tribunal’s
interpretation of section 42 of SIMA was patently unreasonable, but also
addressed a variety of other questions, such as whether or not it was
appropriate for the Tribunal to refer to the GATT in interpreting section
42 of SIMA, whether the Tribunal’s interpretation of section 42
conflicted with Canada’s international obligations under the GATT, and
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the Tribunal’s findings
of material injury.60 In the context of this case, Wilson J. concluded that:
. . . [T]he only issue which this Court may consider, once it accepts
that the interpretation of a given provision is a matter that falls within a
tribunal’s jurisdiction, is whether the Tribunal’s interpretation of the
provision is “so patently unreasonable that its construction cannot be
rationally supported by the relevant legislation”. Thus, if one
determines that the Canadian Import Tribunal’s interpretation of s. 42
of the Act is not “so patently unreasonable that its construction cannot
be rationally supported by the relevant legislation”, then the inquiry
must come to an end.61

In light of the foregoing discussion it is hardly surprising that
Wilson J. concluded that the Tribunal’s interpretation of section 42 of
SIMA was not patently unreasonable. Section 42 may not have been a
provision that “bristles with ambiguities” in Dickson J.’s famous
phrase,62 but it is evident that a number of Canada’s finest judicial minds
experienced difficulty in agreeing on whether it was directed at
subsidized foreign products that had a material impact on Canadian
producers of those products (Iacobucci C.J.), subsidized imports that
actually made their way into the Canadian marketplace and therefore had
59
60
61
62

Id., at 1346.
Id., at 1348.
Id., at 1350.
See C.U.P.E., supra, note 47, at 230.
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an impact or potential impact on Canadian producers (MacGuigan J.A.)
or subsidized foreign products that were potentially imported into
Canada and therefore had a material impact on Canadian producers
(Gonthier J.). This interpretive disagreement extended not only to
section 42 of SIMA but to the GATT Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties Code itself, so even if one accepted the argument that the
Tribunal ought to interpret SIMA in a manner consistent with the Code,
this did not represent a significant advance in addressing the question of
how the Tribunal ought to have interpreted section 42. Under the
circumstances, all four of the rationales for judicial deference identified
by Wilson J. militated in favour of judicial acceptance of the Tribunal
majority’s conclusion on the proper interpretation of the statute.
Nevertheless, it is worth examining how Wilson J. expressed her
conclusion that the Tribunal’s decision should stand. She wrote:
… [W]hile the Tribunal’s interpretation of s. 42 might well be
unsatisfactory to those concerned to secure a more liberal international
trade policy, in my view it can hardly be described as an interpretation
that is “so patently unreasonable that its construction cannot be
rationally supported by the relevant legislation”. The terms “subsidy”
and “subsidized goods” are defined in very broad terms indeed and the
definition of “material injury” certainly cannot be said to preclude the
“broader” interpretation of s. 42(1) that the Tribunal favoured. If the
Tribunal’s interpretation is one that the legislature concludes is not in
Canada’s interests or is not consistent with Canada’s international
obligations, then it is for the legislature to amend the Act to provide
narrower definitions of the terms used in the relevant provision.63

The focus of this passage seems to be on Parliament’s choice of the
Tribunal as opposed to the courts as the body to provide authoritative
meaning to SIMA rather than on the likelihood that the Tribunal was
better equipped than the courts to provide the interpretation most
consistent with the effective administration of the statute. To this extent,
the “legislative choice” rationale for deference seems to be the most
significant influence on Wilson J.’s own conclusion, notwithstanding the
emphasis she gives to the “presumed expertise” and “economic
management” rationales earlier in her reasons.
This does not resolve the methodological disagreement between
Wilson J. and Gonthier J., however, and it is useful at this stage to make
three additional observations about this disagreement before considering
63

National Corn Growers, supra, note 33, at 1352-53.
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Wilson J.’s reasoning in a larger context. The first is that despite their
methodological disagreement, both Wilson J. and Gonthier J. used the
words “patently unreasonable” and “unreasonable” interchangeably.64
This level of agreement in the earlier case law is particularly significant
in light of the jurisprudential odyssey beginning with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,
Competition Act) v. Southam Inc.65 and ending with the Court’s recent
decision in Dunsmuir,66 in which Canadian judges struggled valiantly to
find a workable distinction between two different “reasonableness”
standards of review (“reasonableness simpliciter” and “patent unreasonableness”) before finally abandoning the effort.
The second point is that it is not entirely clear whether Wilson J.’s
comments on the limited role of courts on judicial review represented a
general statement about the limits of judicial review or a specific
statement about the limits of judicial review in the context of the
National Corn Growers case itself. Certainly the first sentence of Wilson
J.’s conclusion on the limited scope of judicial review quoted above67 is
expressed in categorical terms. A number of commentators have
understood her observations in this way and have criticized them, in my
respectful view correctly, as representing too limited a conception of the
role of judicial review.68 A more charitable reading of Wilson J.’s
comments, focusing on the second sentence in the passage quoted above,
might be that she believed that the appellant’s arguments in this
particular case all hinged on the willingness of the Court to intervene to
modify the Tribunal’s understanding of the mandate it was given under
section 42 of SIMA, and once the Court concluded that it would not do
so, its role was at an end. Even if one accepts this reading of Wilson J.’s
comments, it seems to me that there is some merit in Gonthier J.’s
response that it is important for a reviewing court to take the Tribunal’s
own reasoning process seriously in order to determine whether the
64

Id., at 1380, 1373, 1374, 1378, 1379 and 1382-83 (per Gonthier J.) and at 1339-41,
1344-45, 1346, 1348, 1350 and 1352-53 (per Wilson J.).
65
[1996] S.C.J. No. 116, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Southam”].
66
[2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1.S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.).
67
See the text at note 61.
68
See the comments of David Mullan, “Of Chaff Midst the Corn: American Farm Bureau
Federation v. Canada (Canadian Import Tribunal) and Patent Unreasonableness Review” (1991) 45
Admin. L.R. 264, at 270-71, and David Jones & Anne DeVillars, Principles of Administrative Law,
2d ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Canada Ltd., 1994), at 419-22 and 436-37; David Jones &
Anne De Villars, Principles of Administrative Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Canada
Ltd., 2004), at 461.
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interpretation the Tribunal gave to its enabling legislation was a
reasonable one.69
The final observation I would make about the methodological debate
between Wilson J. and Gonthier J. in the National Corn Growers case is
that it is important to bear in mind that all of their jurisprudential
references and their discussion about the role of judicial review are
concentrated on a particular segment of the administrative law world,
namely, the specialized adjudicative or regulatory tribunal. As Canadian
courts have pursued the more ambitious goal of developing “an
overarching or unifying theory for review of the substantive decisions of
all statutory or prerogative decision makers”,70 it should hardly be
surprising that we see coming into play a broader range of considerations
along with a more sophisticated understanding of the full array of
institutional arrangements available. This observation is not meant to
belittle the contribution the debate between Wilson J. and Gonthier J. has
made to our collective understanding of the approach judges ought to
take on judicial review applications, but it is helpful to remind ourselves
that this debate took place within a frame of reference that was
somewhat more limited than the one that has come to be employed over
the past decade.

III. THE EVOLUTION OF CANADIAN SUBSTANTIVE
REVIEW JURISPRUDENCE
It is useful to divide the recent development of Canadian jurisprudence
governing the substantive judicial review of administrative decisionmaking into three phases or stages. The first stage is marked by the
attempt to establish a general framework for deciding when courts
should show deference to the decisions of administrative tribunals. In
terms of the Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, it can be said to
begin with the Court’s 1978 decision in C.U.P.E.71 and culminate in the
Pushpanathan72 decision in 1998. The second phase is characterized by
the elaboration of the Pushpanathan decision and its expansion into a

69

National Corn Growers, [1990] S.C.J. No. 110, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, at 1383 (S.C.C.).
Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] S.C.J. No. 18,
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dr. Q”], at para. 25 (per McLachlin C.J.C.), quoting
David Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 108.
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“unifying theory” as described in Dr. Q73 in 2003. While this phase is
identified with the expansion of the Pushpanathan decision into new
corners of administrative decision-making, it is also characterized by
expressions of dissatisfaction with elements of the Pushpanathan
framework. We are currently in the third stage, which is marked by an
attempt to simplify and scale back elements of the framework. This
represents an attempt to reconcile those whose criticisms had been
largely rejected during the second, expansionist phase to a modified
version of the dominant jurisprudence. The boundary between the
second and third phase is not as sharp as the one between the first and
the second, and it could be argued that it only began in earnest with the
Court’s attempt to recast standard of review jurisprudence in Dunsmuir74
in 2008. On the other hand, one can see signs of this phase emerging as
early as the Court’s decision in Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan,75
released the same day as Dr. Q.
It would be a gross over-simplification to suggest that the
jurisprudence developed in a seamless fashion during each of the stages
described above. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions on
substantive judicial review were far from unanimous during any of the
phases I have just identified, and a different chronology could be
constructed by concentrating on areas of disagreement rather than by
putting the focus on areas where a consensus seems to emerge over
time.76 Nevertheless, it seems to me that with the benefit of hindsight it is
possible to discern a pattern of development within which Wilson J.’s
reasons in the National Corn Growers case can be usefully located.
Chronologically, the National Corn Growers case belongs in the
middle of the first phase, during which the Supreme Court of Canada
made deference to tribunal decision-making an express part of the
jurisprudence governing substantive review but grappled to find a
framework for determining when deference would be available and
when it would not. In the Supreme Court jurisprudence between
C.U.P.E. and National Corn Growers, much attention was focused on
drawing a distinction between cases where tribunals were interpreting
statutory provisions that conferred jurisdiction on them or expressed the
limits of their jurisdiction, in which case the tribunal’s interpretation was
73

Supra, note 70.
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not entitled to deference, and the interpretation of provisions falling
within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, which were entitled to deference, at
least if the tribunal’s decision was protected by a privative clause.77 On
the face of it, because this issue did not arise in the National Corn
Growers case itself, Wilson J. had little to say about how the distinction
should be drawn other than to suggest that it should not be drawn in a
manner that undermined the Court’s general posture of deference to the
decisions of specialized tribunals.78 As the case law evolved over the
course of the 1990s, however, this line of authority became subsumed in
a more general discussion of the circumstances in which deference was
or was not warranted, and Wilson J.’s general observations on the
rationales for deference are relevant to this discussion.
Three themes emerged during the course of this debate. The first was
that deference to tribunal decision-making was not confined to tribunals
whose decisions were protected by privative clauses. This development
had already occurred prior to the National Corn Growers decision, as
Wilson J. pointed out in her reasons, but it was to accelerate as the 1990s
wore on.79 The second theme was the emergence of a very restrictive
definition of when a tribunal’s interpretation of its enabling legislation
could be deemed “patently unreasonable”.80 This development was
somewhat at odds with the willingness of the Supreme Court of Canada
majority in the Lester case,81 and Wilson J. herself in a dissenting
judgment in Paccar,82 to invalidate tribunal decisions using the “patently
unreasonable” standard of review. This tension was to intensify in the
expansionist phase that followed the Court’s decision in Pushpanathan83
and was one of the factors that contributed to the retrenchment we are
seeing in the current stage of jurisprudential development. The third
theme, which was influenced by the first and second, was the
77
See, for example, Teamsters Union Local 938 v. Massicotte, [1982] S.C.J. No. 37,
[1982] 1 S.C.R. 710 (S.C.C.); Blanchard v. Control Data Canada Ltd., [1984] S.C.J. No. 51, [1984]
2 S.C.R. 476 (S.C.C.); Syndicat des employés de production du Québec et de l’Acadie v. Canada
(Labour Relations Board), [1984] S.C.J. No. 49, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 412 (S.C.C.); Union des employés
de service, Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] S.C.J. No. 101, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048 (S.C.C.).
78
See National Corn Growers, [1990] S.C.J. No. 110, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, at 1343-46.
79
See, for example, Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] S.C.J.
No. 58, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.); Southam, supra, note 65.
80
See, for example, Canada (Attorney General) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada,
[1993] S.C.J. No. 35, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941 at 963-64 (S.C.C.).
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[1990] S.C.J. No. 127, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 644 (S.C.C.).
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[1989] S.C.J. No. 107, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983 (S.C.C.).
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[1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 (S.C.C.).
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development of a spectrum of standards of review to fill in the
conceptual territory where some deference was warranted but where the
Supreme Court was uncomfortable confining courts to an extremely
limited review role using the restrictive version of the “patently
unreasonable” standard. The view at the time, expressed most clearly by
Iacobucci J.,84 was that the logic of a sophisticated and comprehensive
system of judicial review required at least one intermediate review
standard to occupy the ground between correctness review and review
employing a very deferential “patently unreasonable” standard.
Although Bastarache J.’s decision in Pushpanathan has become the
foundation for the subsequent development of standard of review
jurisprudence, the structure of Bastarache J.’s reasons suggests that he
saw the exercise as a consolidation of the previous jurisprudence rather
than a fresh start in the Court’s thinking about standards of review.
Perhaps for that reason, the decision tends to blend different strands of
jurisprudence together as factors in a four-part test for determining the
appropriate standard of review. These factors are: (1) the presence or
absence of a privative clause or right of appeal;85 (2) the relative
expertise of the court and the tribunal with respect to the issue in
dispute;86 (3) the purpose of the statutory scheme, and in particular the
statutory provisions that are in dispute;87 and (4) the nature of the
problem, and in particular whether it involved mainly legal or factual
questions.88 By analyzing these factors in respect of each issue in
dispute, a reviewing court was to identify the appropriate standard of
review for each issue along a spectrum of standards ranging from
correctness to the “patently unreasonable” standard of review.89
The first three of these factors are linked respectively to the
“legislative choice”, “presumed expertise” and “economic management”
rationales for judicial deference to tribunal decision-making identified
by Wilson J. in the National Corn Growers90 case. Justice Wilson herself
did not create these rationales, but she did express them in a particularly
84

See, for example, Southam, supra, note 65, at para. 55; Hon. Frank Iacobucci,
“Articulating a Rational Standard of Review Doctrine: A Tribute to John Willis” (2002) 27 Queen’s
L.J. 860.
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Pushpanathan, supra, note 83, at paras. 30-31.
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Id., at paras. 32-35.
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Id., at para. 36.
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Id., at para. 37.
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Id., at para. 27.
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clear fashion and Bastarache J. acknowledged his intellectual debt to her
reasons in National Corn Growers in two passages in his reasons in
Pushpanathan. He referred generally to National Corn Growers to
illustrate the proposition that courts may defer to expert tribunals even
with respect to matters of statutory interpretation91 and specifically to
Wilson J.’s reasons in support of the view that judicial deference was
particularly appropriate in reviewing decisions of agencies engaged in
economic management.92
To the extent that Wilson J.’s reasons in National Corn Growers were
designed to promote a general posture of judicial deference to tribunal
decision-making, however, her views did not carry the day. To some
extent this development was inevitable as the Supreme Court of Canada
moved from thinking about the proper approach to the review of decisions
made by specialized tribunals, whose members could be considered to be
subject matter experts and whose decisions were often protected by
privative clauses, to review of the full range of administrative action that
extended to decisions of mass justice bureaucracies, elected local
government officials and beyond. On the other hand, the multi-factor
analysis developed in Pushpanathan was sufficiently malleable that the
courts were able to grant and withhold deference on a much more
selective basis than one would expect if Wilson J.’s reasoning in the
National Corn Growers case were being applied.
Two illustrations are sufficient for present purposes. The first is the
Pushpanathan case itself. It had significant parallels to National Corn
Growers since the Court was reviewing a decision of a specialized
federal tribunal charged with interpreting a statute that was designed to
implement an international obligation, in this case the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.93 It would not be difficult
to imagine a court drawing an analogy with National Corn Growers and
concluding that the Immigration and Refugee Board’s interpretation of
its enabling legislation ought to be entitled to judicial deference.
Notwithstanding these similarities, however, the Supreme Court of
Canada was unanimous in concluding that the “correctness” standard of
review should be applied.94
91

Supra, note 83, at para. 34.
Id., at para. 36.
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U.N.T.S./R.T.N.U 150.
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Justice Bastarache’s elaborate reasons for choosing the correctness
standard certainly offered plausible grounds for distinguishing the
decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board in Pushpanathan from
those of the Canadian Import Tribunal in National Corn Growers. The
decisions of the Board were not protected by a privative clause,95 and
arguably the scheme of limiting access to judicial review to situations in
which a “serious question of general importance”96 was certified by the
Federal Court Trial Division (as it then was) signalled a legislative
intention to have the courts review decisions that were so certified using
the correctness standard.97 Likewise, the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board was determining
legal rights and obligations rather than engaging in the type of
polycentric interest balancing characteristic of a regulatory agency
carrying out economic management functions.98
Nevertheless, the Pushpanathan decision also sowed the seeds of
greater intervention in the work of economic regulatory bodies through
the approach the Court took to the definition of a tribunal’s specialized
expertise. Justice Bastarache concluded that the Board did not have
greater expertise than the courts in interpreting its enabling legislation
because its work involved “general questions of law” and its enabling
legislation did not require all members to have specialized legal
expertise.99 Justice Wilson in National Corn Growers presumed that the
Canadian Import Tribunal had expertise because of the specialized
character of its adjudicative role, but after Pushpanathan, courts would
be able to define the relative expertise of courts and tribunals by
concentrating on the precise nature of the issue in dispute and by close
scrutiny of the structure of the administrative body whose decisions were
under review.100
The second illustration can be found in a Supreme Court of Canada
decision from the second phase of development of the standard of review

95

See the reasons of Bastarache J. in Pushpanathan, id., at para. 49.
See Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, s. 83(1).
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Pushpanathan, supra, note 83, at paras. 43-44.
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Id., at para. 48.
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Id., at paras. 45-47.
100
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framework: Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Assn.101
In that case, the Supreme Court majority held that the Canadian Radiotelevision and Telecommunications Commission did not have
specialized expertise relative to the courts in interpreting a provision of
its enabling legislation governing access to the supporting structures of
transmission lines since this was not considered to be a question of a
technical nature. Justice Bastarache disagreed. He adopted Wilson J.’s
view that an expert tribunal is normally entitled to deference in its
interpretation of its enabling legislation because the tribunal is typically
in a better position than the Court to understand both the policy context
and the policy implications of different interpretive choices.102 In
contrast, by segmenting the tribunal’s expertise into technical matters
that were entitled to deference and matters of general statutory
interpretation that were not, the majority effectively undermined the
tribunal’s ability to authoritatively interpret its mandate in the manner
that was most consistent with the interplay between statutory language
and public policy goals, and asserted the primacy of the textual approach
to interpretation typically favoured by judges.
As the Barrie Public Utilities case demonstrates, the Pushpanathan
decision provided Canadian courts with a framework for addressing
questions of when they should defer to the decisions of administrative
bodies rather than a set of bright line tests for answering those questions.
The Supreme Court of Canada obviously thought that answers would
become clear as courts at all levels of the justice system gained
experience in using the framework. The Court quickly embraced the
framework, and expanded its use from the review of the decisions of
administrative tribunals to the review of discretionary decisions by
public officials103 and then to the substantive review of the exercise of
delegated legislative authority and other policy decisions by local
government.104 By 2001, Canada’s leading academic commentator on
101

[2003] S.C.J. No. 27, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 476 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Barrie Public

Utilities”].
102

Id., at para. 86. Justice Bastarache also made reference to Wilson J.’s reasoning in the
National Corn Growers case, supra, note 78, directly at para. 77 and indirectly at para. 128.
103
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 39, [1999]
2 S.C.R. 817 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Baker”]; Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec (Minister of
Health and Social Services), [2001] S.C.J. No. 43, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mount
Sinai”].
104
Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., [2000] S.C.J. No. 14, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342
(S.C.C.); Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chamberlain”].
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administrative law, Professor David Mullan, was describing the
Pushpanathan framework as “an overarching or unifying theory for
review of the substantive decisions of all manner of statutory and
prerogative decision-makers”,105 a description that was explicitly adopted
in 2003 by McLachlin C.J.C. writing for a unanimous Supreme Court of
Canada in the Dr. Q case.106
While disagreements about the application of the framework in
particular cases were to be expected,107 there were also disquieting signs
of dissatisfaction with the framework itself even during the expansionist
phase of its development. At the Supreme Court of Canada, these
expressions of dissatisfaction were put forward most forcefully by LeBel
J. in a series of dissenting and minority judgments beginning with the
Chamberlain case in 2002. The concern he expressed in Chamberlain
was that it was inappropriate to use a framework designed with reference
to administrative tribunals in order to assess the proper standard of
review of decisions of local government bodies. In his view, the attempt
to do so was likely to distort rather than clarify judicial thinking about
how to approach the relationship between the courts and these
organizations.108 In Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public
Employees, Local 79,109 and Voice Construction Ltd. v. Construction and
General Workers’ Union, Local 92,110 however, LeBel J. raised more
fundamental questions about the way the Pushpanathan framework was
being used by the courts. First, he asked whether the four-factor analysis
was not overly complicated in at least some cases, with the result that the
courts risked going through a formulaic exercise to reach a result that
could have been obtained much more simply.111 Second, and more
fundamentally, he raised serious questions about how the “patently
unreasonable” standard of review had been defined and applied in recent
105

David Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 108.
[2003] S.C.J. No. 18, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.).
107
In particular, members of the Supreme Court of Canada continue to have difficulty
agreeing on the circumstances in which a specialized tribunal’s interpretation of its enabling
legislation will be entitled to deference from the courts. Justice Abella seems to me the most
consistent defender of the use of a deferential standard of review in these circumstances, and
Deschamps and Rothstein JJ. appear to take the most expansive view of the circumstances in which
the use of the correctness standard is appropriate. See, for example, VIA Rail, [2007] S.C.J. No. 15,
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.), Dunsmuir, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), and
Proprio Direct, [2008] S.C.J. No. 32, 2008 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).
108
Chamberlain, supra, note 104, at paras. 190-95.
109
[2003] S.C.J. No. 64, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Toronto v. C.U.P.E.”].
110
[2004] S.C.J. No. 2. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 609, (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Voice Construction”].
111
Toronto v. C.U.P.E., supra, note 109, at para. 62.
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Supreme Court of Canada decisions112 and about the utility of the
conceptual distinctions the Court had attempted to draw between review
using the “patent unreasonableness” and “reasonableness simpliciter”
standards.113
The Supreme Court of Canada did not concede that major surgery on
the Pushpanathan framework was needed until it released its decision in
Dunsmuir114 in 2008, but there were earlier signs that the Court was
sensitive to the argument that the framework was excessively complicated.
Even the Ryan decision,115 released at the peak of the Court’s commitment
to the Pushpanathan framework in 2003, represents a concession to the
demand for simplicity since it signals a shift from the idea that a variety of
standards of review existed on a continuum to a commitment to use only
three standards of review: correctness, reasonableness simpliciter and
patent unreasonableness. Justice Iacobucci, who wrote the reasons for a
unanimous Court, acknowledged that greater refinement in the standard of
review framework is not always productive. He observed:
At this point, the multiplication of standards past the three already
identified would force reviewing courts and the parties that appear
before them into complex and technical debates at the outset. I am not
convinced that the increase in complexity generated by adding a fourth
standard would lead to greater precision in achieving the objectives of
judicial review of administrative action.116

Other gestures in the direction of simplification were soon to follow.
In United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary
(City),117 decided in 2004, the Court decided that where the question at
issue was whether or not a municipal by-law was ultra vires, the
Pushpanathan analysis was unnecessary because correctness would
always be the appropriate standard of review. And in her reasons for the
majority in VIA Rail, decided in 2007, Justice Abella signalled that the
Court was open to collapsing the distinction between the two
“reasonableness” standards of review.118

112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id., at paras. 63-66, 77-99.
Id., at paras. 100-134; Voice Construction, supra, note 110, at paras. 40-42.
[2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.).
[2003] S.C.J. No. 17, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 25.
[2004] S.C.J. No. 19, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.).
VIA Rail, supra, note 107, at paras. 101-103.
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If the Supreme Court of Canada’s retreat from elements of its
previous standard of review jurisprudence in Dunsmuir cannot be said to
come as a complete surprise, the reasons of Bastarache and LeBel JJ. for
the majority in Dunsmuir nevertheless represent a significant concession
to those who had expressed concerns about the complexity of the
Pushpanathan framework for judicial review. In particular, the explicit
abandonment of the third standard of review,119 an idea that had been
part of the Court’s jurisprudence since 1997120 and had been expressly
endorsed by a unanimous Court in Ryan121 as recently as 2004, suggests
that those who believe that the standard of review jurisprudence had
become unnecessarily complex have won the upper hand. Moreover, the
minority judgment of Deschamps J. in Dunsmuir (concurred in by
Charron and Rothstein JJ.) and her dissenting judgment in Proprio
Direct122 (concurred in by Rothstein J.) indicate that at least some
members of the Court are interested in further shrinking the range of
circumstances in which courts defer to the decisions of tribunals.
Despite these concessions, however, the majority reasons in
Dunsmuir represent a retreat from the most elaborate expression of the
Pushpanathan framework rather than a wholesale abandonment of
judicial deference to tribunal decision-making. In particular, the
discussion Bastarache and LeBel JJ. offered on the selection of the appropriate standard of review was designed to simplify the use of the
Pushpanathan framework without fundamentally compromising the framework’s basic features. While Bastarache and LeBel JJ. identified a
number of situations in which courts would be able to select the
appropriate standard of review without going through a full standard of
review analysis using the Pushpanathan framework,123 the factors that
make up the framework remain intact and continue to be applicable
where it is not possible for a court to reach a definitive conclusion using
a simplified analysis.124
Justice Wilson’s reasons in National Corn Growers125 are not referred
to in Dunsmuir, and the use of three distinct standards of review was
119

See Dunsmuir, supra, note 114, at paras. 44-50.
The intermediate “reasonableness simpliciter” standard of review was introduced in
Iacobucci J.’s reasons in Southam, [1996] S.C.J. No. 116, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 (S.C.C.).
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Supra, note 115.
122
Supra, note 107.
123
Dunsmuir, supra, note 114, at paras. 52-61.
124
Id., at paras. 62-64.
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[1990] S.C.J. No. 110, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 (S.C.C.).
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developed after she left the Court, so it is difficult to predict how she would
have viewed the Court’s abandonment of the third standard of review in
Dunsmuir. On the whole, however, I do not believe this development
would have troubled her. As her dissenting judgment in the Paccar case
reveals, she did not believe that a general posture of deference to tribunal
decision-making prevented courts from intervening where a tribunal made
an interpretive or policy choice that was not consistent with or supportable
by the tribunal’s enabling legislation.126 In the same case, she indicated that
she did not favour an approach to judicial review using the “patently
unreasonable” standard that would “define patent unreasonableness in
terms of rational indefensibility”,127 arguing that the substitution of one
phrase for another was not helpful and that a “rational indefensibility” test
might be viewed as even more restrictive of judicial intervention than the
“patently unreasonable” standard. As I noted earlier, in National Corn
Growers both Wilson J. and Gonthier J. used the terms “patently
unreasonable” and “unreasonable” interchangeably, and I do not believe
that she would have found it offensive for the courts to use a unified
“reasonableness” standard to express their deference to tribunal decisionmaking.
What is less clear is how she would have viewed the approach to
reasonableness review endorsed by Bastarache and LeBel JJ. in Dunsmuir.
Their thoughts on this subject are worth quoting at some length:
The move towards a single reasonableness standard does not pave
the way for a more intrusive review by courts and does not represent a
return to pre-Southam formalism. In this respect, the concept of
deference, so central to judicial review in administrative law, has
perhaps been insufficiently explored in the case law. What does
deference mean in this context? Deference is both an attitude of the
court and a requirement of the law of judicial review. It does not mean
that courts are subservient to the determinations of decision makers, or
that courts must show blind reverence to their interpretations, or that
they may be content to pay lip service to the concept of reasonableness
review while in fact imposing their own view. Rather, deference
imports respect for the decision-making process of adjudicative bodies
with regard to both the facts and the law. The notion of deference “is
rooted in part in a respect for governmental decisions to create
administrative bodies with delegated powers” [Canada (Attorney
General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, at p. 596, per L’Heureux126
127

[1989] S.C.J. No. 107, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983, at 1022-23 (S.C.C.).
Id., at 1022.
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Dubé J., dissenting]. We agree with David Dyzenhaus where he states
that the concept of “deference as respect” requires of the courts “not
submission but a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which
could be offered in support of a decision”: “The Politics of Deference:
Judicial Review and Democracy”, in M. Taggart, ed., The Province of
Administrative Law (1997), 279, at p. 286 (quoted with approval in
Baker, at para. 65, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; Ryan, at para. 49).
Deference in the context of the reasonableness standard therefore
implies that courts will give due consideration to the determinations of
decision makers. As Mullan explains, a policy of deference
“recognizes the reality that, in many instances, those working day to
day in the implementation of frequently complex administrative
schemes have or will develop a considerable degree of expertise or
field sensitivity to the imperatives and nuances of the legislative
regime”: D.J. Mullan, “Establishing the Standard of Review: The
Struggle for Complexity?” (2004), 17 C.J.A.L.P. 59, at p. 93. In short,
deference requires respect for the legislative choices to leave some
matters in the hands of administrative decision makers, for the
processes and determinations that draw on particular expertise and
experiences, and for the different roles of the courts and administrative
bodies within the Canadian constitutional system.128

Insofar as Bastarache and LeBel JJ. were endorsing the “legislative
choice” rationale for deference in this passage, their reasons are
consistent with Wilson J.’s general observations in the National Corn
Growers case and the primacy her conclusions appear to accord to that
rationale. It is less obvious how this rationale is to be reconciled with the
notion of deference as respect. It has never seemed to me that
disagreement with another decision-maker’s conclusions automatically
implies lack of respect. A reviewing court (or, for that matter, an
academic commentator) can sometimes fail to give serious consideration
to the reasoning that influenced a decision-maker to select a particular
course of action, and that failure can be said to indicate a lack of respect.
But serious consideration is not the same thing as agreement, and it is
not clear to me why deference as respect should require a reviewing
court to prefer a tribunal’s interpretation of its enabling legislation to the
interpretation that seems more persuasive to a court where the issue is
one on which reasonable people could disagree, which will often be the
case. At a minimum, it seems to me that the idea of deference as respect
implies an approach to judicial review that is more consistent with
128

Dunsmuir, supra, note 114, at paras. 48-49.
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Gonthier J.’s detailed analysis of the reasons offered by various
decision-makers in the National Corn Growers case than Wilson J.’s
approach, and that it is likely to lead to greater judicial intervention in
tribunal decision-making than if her preferred methodology were
adopted.

IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE WILSON’S REASONING FOR
CONTEMPORARY STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS
Having situated Wilson J.’s reasoning in National Corn Growers129
within the framework of the development of contemporary standard of
review analysis, what conclusions can we draw about the significance of
her reasons for that jurisprudence? I have already touched on a number
of the areas of disagreement that have featured prominently in the
jurisprudence since the National Corn Growers decision was rendered,
but it may be convenient to enumerate them for purposes of this
discussion. The first is the scope of judicial review, and more
particularly whether courts are confined to reviewing purely legal
questions addressed by administrative bodies in the course of making
decisions. The second is how to decide when reviewing courts should
accord deference to administrative decision-makers and when they
should not do so. And the third is how to conceive of judicial deference
to administrative decision-making, or in practical terms, how a
reviewing court is to decide that an administrative decision is
sufficiently unreasonable that it must be overturned notwithstanding the
court’s general posture of deference to the administrative decisionmaker.
With respect to the first issue, the general scope of judicial review, I
agree with earlier commentators who observed that, if Wilson J.’s
reasons in National Corn Growers are read as limiting all substantive
judicial review to an assessment of an administrative decision-maker’s
interpretation of its enabling legislation, that conception of judicial
review represents too narrow a view of the court’s mandate.130 It may be
129

Supra, note 125.
See the comments of David Mullan, “Of Chaff Midst the Corn: American Farm Bureau
Federation v. Canada (Canadian Import Tribunal) and Patent Unreasonableness Review” (1991) 45
Admin. L.R. 264, at 270-71, and David Jones & Anne de Villars, Principles of Administrative Law,
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possible to reconcile Wilson J.’s observations with mainstream
jurisprudence by noting that courts are not bound by the parties’
characterization of the nature of the issues in dispute, and there will be
circumstances in which the true nature of the dispute can be
characterized as one that turns on a tribunal’s interpretation of its
enabling statute. Nevertheless, it is clear from the jurisprudence that
sufficiently serious errors in making factual findings131 or sufficiently
unreasonable exercises of discretion132 can form the basis for judicial
intervention as well as unreasonable interpretations of statute.
With respect to the second issue, when deference is owed, it is clear
from the foregoing discussion that Wilson J.’s views have been influential
but have not entirely carried the day. Even if her general approach to
deference has not been followed consistently by Canadian courts, Wilson
J.’s methodological insights have been persuasive in identifying the perils
of what has come to be known as “segmentation” of tribunal decisionmaking.133 As far back as the use of the “preliminary and collateral
questions” doctrine134 and the “wrong questions” doctrine,135 courts were
expanding opportunities for intervention into administrative decisionmaking by separating a tribunal’s decision into a number of discrete
questions and finding that if the tribunal failed to answer one or more of
those questions correctly in the view of the court, the tribunal had
exceeded its jurisdiction. Excessive use of these doctrines was criticized
by Dickson J. (as he then was) in C.U.P.E.,136 and one seldom sees
reference to them in contemporary judicial review decisions. Nevertheless,
their modern equivalent is found in such things as the tendency illustrated
in the Barrie Public Utilities case137 to segment a specialist tribunal’s
expertise into technical questions, on which the tribunal is entitled to

131
See, for example, Toronto Board of Education v. Ontario Secondary School Teachers’
Federation, District 15, [1997] S.C.J. No. 27, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 487 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Toronto v.
O.S.S.T.F.”]; Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 301 v. Montreal (City), [1997] S.C.J. No.
39, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 793 (S.C.C.).
132
See, for example, Baker, supra, note 103; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour),
[2003] S.C.J. No. 28, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C.U.P.E. v. Ontario”].
133
See the reasons of Binnie J. in Dunsmuir, supra, note 114, at para. 142.
134
See, for example, Bell v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [1971] S.C.J. No. 66,
[1971] S.C.R. 756 (S.C.C.).
135
See, for example, Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C.
147; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 796,
[1970] S.C.J. No. 9, [1970] S.C.R. 425 (S.C.C.).
136
[1979] S.C.J. No. 45, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, at 233 (S.C.C.).
137
Supra, note 101.
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judicial deference, and general questions of law and interpretation, which
the tribunal must decide correctly in the eyes of a reviewing court.
Unfortunately, it has been easier to identify the risks of excessive
segmentation than it has been to propose the abandonment of
segmentation entirely. Indeed, even though Wilson J. seemed attracted
by Professor Langille’s idea of a general posture of judicial deference to
specialized tribunals, she did not fully embrace the idea that there were
never circumstances in which correctness review was appropriate, and
left that question for another day.138 The majority decision in Dunsmuir
identified a number of situations in which it is presumptively appropriate
for reviewing courts to use the correctness standard in reviewing an
administrative decision, including determinations of constitutional
questions by administrative bodies139 and determinations relating to the
jurisdictional boundaries between two or more specialized tribunals.140
These types of issues will rarely be the sole question facing an
administrative body; they will more typically arise as part of a
determination being made by the body in the course of exercising its
statutory authority. If these types of issues are to be fully addressed by
reviewing courts, therefore, it seems to me that more often than not the
court will be engaged in segmentation of the administrative body’s
decision. To say that segmentation in these circumstances is always
inappropriate seems to me to represent an abandonment of a central
function of judicial review, so in my view a sophisticated and
comprehensive system of judicial review has to be prepared to
countenance segmentation of decision-making in at least some
circumstances. The key is to draw principled boundaries around when
segmentation is appropriate, and to avoid the temptation to use
segmentation as a vehicle to enable courts to engage in more searching
review than is warranted by the circumstances.
I want to concentrate my concluding observations on the third issue,
our concept of deference, because this is the area in which I believe that
neither Wilson J. in National Corn Growers nor the subsequent
jurisprudence has offered sufficient guidance. It seems to me that where
Wilson J.’s reasons made their most lasting contribution to contemporary
judicial review jurisprudence was in identifying with clarity the different
rationales for judicial deference to administrative decision-making.
138
139
140

See the discussion in the text at notes 56-59.
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Unfortunately, the tension inherent in these different rationales for
deference was not resolved by her or in the jurisprudence to date.
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere,141 a deferential standard of review
is of limited practical utility until reviewing courts develop a sophisticated
understanding not only of the rationales for deference but of the rationales
for intervention notwithstanding a general posture of deference.
It seems to me that the “statutory indeterminacy” rationale for
deference sounds a useful precautionary note for courts in entering into
the process of deferential review of administrative interpretations of
statutes, but it is not an adequate explanation for why the court should
accept an expert tribunal’s interpretation of a statute in preference to its
own once it has taken careful account of the tribunal’s reasoning. The
“presumed expertise” rationale provides a reason for the court to be
willing to accept the tribunal’s interpretation as a general proposition,
but it seems to me that it is not a particularly compelling reason. This
rationale invites a reviewing court to presume that a specialized tribunal
is more likely than the court to be able to identify the interpretation of
the legislation that best combines the tribunal’s ability to operate
effectively with respect for the limitations of its statutory mandate. By
implication, however, it also invites the party dissatisfied with the
tribunal’s decision to attempt to rebut that presumption. It is not
impossible in my view to create a discipline for this process that makes it
fundamentally different than review using a “correctness” standard.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that in the absence of such a discipline,
Wilson J. was justified in her concern that if courts can be persuaded to
inquire too closely into a tribunal’s reasoning in reaching its decision,
the temptation to engage in “correctness” review under the guise of
“reasonableness” review might be too great to resist.
To the extent that the “economic management” rationale for deference
is understood as simply reinforcing the “presumed expertise” rationale for
tribunals that operate in certain subject matter areas, it shares the frailties
of that rationale. It can be argued, however, that the “economic
management” rationale depends less on the superiority of the tribunal’s
specialized expertise than on the legislation’s decision to place managerial
responsibility over a particular area of the economy into the hands of a
tribunal. Although it is far from clear that Wilson J. saw the “economic
management” rationale this way, it could be argued that this rationale is
141
See Philip Bryden, “Understanding the Standard of Review in Administrative Law”
(2005) 54 U.N.B.L.J. 75.
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better understood as a special instance of the “legislative choice” rationale
rather than of the “presumed expertise” rationale. The “legislative choice”
rationale does offer courts a compelling reason for preferring a tribunal’s
interpretive choices to its own, because it instructs courts to respect the
legislature’s decision to confer on the tribunal the basic right to make
authoritative decisions, and more specifically to give authoritative
meaning to a statute. As I will explain, I do not believe that this authority
is unlimited, and the “legislative choice” rationale continues to offer courts
a meaningful, albeit severely restricted, role in review using a
reasonableness standard. It seems to me, however, that the “legislative
choice” rationale for deference places courts in a qualitatively different
position on judicial review than the “presumed expertise” rationale.
To explain this difference, it is helpful to explore some of the
rationales that can be offered for judicial intervention in tribunal
decision-making notwithstanding a general posture of deference. A nonexhaustive list that can be derived from Canadian case law includes the
following reasons for intervention:142
(1) A tribunal has made a decision in bad faith.143
(2) A tribunal’s decision is grounded on a legal premise that is
unquestionably incorrect (for example, the decision relies on a
statutory provision that has been repealed).144
(3) There are serious flaws in the logical underpinnings of a tribunal’s
decision.145
(4) A tribunal goes beyond its interpretive mandate and effectively seeks
to amend its enabling legislation in the guise of interpreting it.146

142
143

For a more detailed explanation of this list, see id., at 94-99.
See, for example, Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121

(S.C.C.).
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See Vernon (City) v. Vernon Professional Fire Fighters Assn., International Assn. of
Fire Fighters, Local 1517, [1996] B.C.J. No. 1750 (B.C.S.C.), in which an arbitrator interpreting a
piece of legislation that had recently been enacted relied on the text of the Bill that introduced the
legislation, and the text of the relevant section had been amended on Third Reading.
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See, for example, Toronto v. O.S.S.T.F., [1997] S.C.J. No. 27, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 487
(S.C.C.); Mount Sinai Hospital, [2001] S.C.J. No. 43, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 342 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J.
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(5) A tribunal’s interpretation of its enabling legislation is inconsistent
with basic and well accepted principles of statutory interpretation.147
(6) A tribunal’s decision is inconsistent with basic legal norms in
Canadian society.148
(7) A tribunal’s decision is inconsistent with the policy objectives of its
enabling legislation.149
It seems to me that whatever rationale one adopts for deference to
tribunal decision-making as a general proposition, the first two reasons
on this list justify judicial intervention. In other words, even if we
assume that the legislature intended to confer on a tribunal the power to
make authoritative decisions including authoritative interpretations of its
enabling legislation, it is both implausible and constitutionally offensive
to suggest that the legislature intended to confer on a tribunal the
authority to act in bad faith or to make decisions that are contrary to
basic and uncontested rules of law. The third and fourth rationales for
intervention are likely to provoke controversy in their application, since
decision-makers are unlikely to agree that their decisions are
fundamentally logically flawed or that they have stepped beyond the
boundaries of interpretation and usurped the right to amend legislation.
In principle, however, it seems to me that these rationales for
intervention still respect the basic principle of legislative choice of an
administrative body rather than as the final arbiter of the interpretation of
a statute. This is because it is reasonable to assume that the legislature
did not intend delegates of statutory authority to make decisions on a
basis that is logically unsupportable or to amend rather than interpret
their legislative mandates.
As we move to the next three reasons for intervention, however, it
seems to me that they are easier to reconcile with the “presumed
expertise” rationale for deference than with the “legislative choice”
rationale. For example, it seems to me that it is not inherently
implausible to suggest that one reason a legislature might prefer to have
a tribunal rather than a court make authoritative decisions about the
147

See Jones v. New Brunswick (Board of Management), 2004 NBCA 65, [2004] N.B.J. No.
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proper interpretation of a statute is that the legislature believes that the
approach judges are likely to take, embedded as it is in certain
approaches to the interpretation of legislative texts, will thwart rather
than serve the legislature’s public policy goals. Similarly, it is plausible
to suggest that legislatures may choose to use tribunals rather than
judges as decision-makers because they want to avoid reliance on
judicially defined legal norms. For example, it can be argued that
legislatures moved collective bargaining disputes out of the courts and
into the administrative tribunal arena precisely in order to avoid
decision-makers who were likely to be influenced by the norms
characteristic of the common law governing employment. A similar
argument can be advanced for the use of workers’ compensation boards
rather than courts to deal with industrial accidents and illness in order to
avoid decision-making that was excessively influenced by the norms
embedded in the common law of torts. Finally, it seems to me that for a
court to invalidate a specialized tribunal’s decision on the basis that it is
inconsistent with the policy goals of its enabling legislation comes
perilously close to rejecting the legislative choice rationale entirely. If
the legislative choice rationale is to be meaningful at all it must, in my
view, include the right of the tribunal rather than the courts to define the
policy objectives of its enabling statute and determine how best to
balance the statute’s competing policy goals.
To say that legislatures are entitled, within constitutional limits, to
choose tribunals rather than courts as the final arbiters of statutory
schemes for the reasons just enumerated is not the same thing as saying
that the selection of decision-making by a specialized tribunal always
carries with it the presumption that the legislature has made such a
choice. Thus, it is not in my view inconsistent to maintain that courts can
simultaneously respect the specialized expertise of tribunals and expect
that the legislature both intended the tribunals to respect certain norms of
statutory interpretation and intended judges to police compliance with
those norms. Likewise, taking advantage of the virtues of specialized
expertise need not imply the abandonment of a commitment to
interpretation that is consistent with broader, judicially defined legal
norms. Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that one of the roles of judicial
review is to ensure that these norms are not too readily sacrificed by
specialized tribunals in the pursuit of other public policy goals. Finally,
it seems to me that recognizing that specialized tribunals will generally
be in a better position than courts to determine whether or not a
particular interpretation or decision best furthers the public policy goals
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of a piece of legislation is not the same thing as saying that they will
always do a better job than courts in making that determination. It is not
in my view incoherent to suggest that some level of judicial scrutiny of a
tribunal’s choices for consistency with a statute’s overall policy goals
can represent a useful form of quality control over tribunal decisionmaking, even if one must recognize its perils as well as its possibilities.
I do not mean to suggest that explicit recognition of the differences
between the rationales for judicial deference and intervention in
administrative decision-making resolves all the tensions that exist at an
operational level. For example, in her judgment in the National Corn
Growers case, Wilson J. argued that the courts should not interfere with the
tribunal’s adoption of a particular interpretation of its enabling legislation,
and if the legislature was dissatisfied with that interpretation it was open to
it to amend the legislation.150 These observations doubtless represented cold
comfort to the disappointed litigants in those particular disputes, but they
were a particularly robust expression of the logical implications of the
“legislative choice” rationale for deference. It seems to me that the same
reasoning was open to the Supreme Court in relation to the British
Columbia Industrial Relations Council’s decision in Paccar,151 and indeed
was arguably embraced by La Forest J. writing for the majority. Yet in that
particular instance Wilson J. would have been willing to intervene and
overturn the decision, which suggests that her commitment to the
“legislative choice” rationale was not sufficiently robust to overcome her
reluctance to accept every public policy choice that was logically open to a
specialized tribunal. No doubt any theory of judicial deference is
vulnerable to the understandable desire of a reviewing court to do justice to
the litigants by imposing its understanding of the best approach to the
substantive questions underlying the dispute. Nevertheless, it seems to me
that explicit judicial recognition of the distinctions identified above would
enrich our understanding of standard of review jurisprudence, and could
assist in making that jurisprudence more internally consistent.

V. CONCLUSION
Justice Wilson’s decision in the National Corn Growers152 case was
a significant contribution to the development of Canadian jurisprudence
150
151
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with respect to the common law judicial review of administrative
decision-making. To argue as I do that Justice Wilson’s reasons do not
represent a fully satisfactory account of judicial review is not in any way
to underestimate the value of that contribution. Canadian thinking about
judicial review has come a long way since the National Corn Growers
case was decided in 1990, and it would be overly optimistic to believe
that Dunsmuir153 represents the final resting place in the evolution of our
jurisprudence. The fact that Justice Wilson’s reasoning in the National
Corn Growers case still inspires debate is a testament to the power of her
expression of her insights, and in this, as in many other areas of our law,
Canadians owe her a profound debt of gratitude.
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